Case of the Mondays Roundup

Item 1: Woe is me, for my team is the Bucs. Maybe Freeman can salvage something out of this torturous season.

Item 2: Why are Middle Eastern politics so complex and incomprehensible? Probably because of the most fundamental governmental problem in the Middle East: simple theocracy, or failure to separate church and state. It's an incredibly complicating factor in regional politics over there. Not only is it largely to blame for repressive social policies by inherently trying to legislate morality (can you imagine a hardcore Catholic or Southern Baptist GOVERNMENT in the U.S.?), but I'd say it also accounts for a great deal of unnecessary intra-regional conflict.

It's too bad that the political innovation that has allowed other regions of the world to enjoy the bounty of human prosperity and advancement remains inconceivable in the once-advanced civilizations of the Middle East. Indeed, I would submit that theocracy has done more to damn Muslims and their progeny, at least on Earth, than it has to save them.

Item 3: Why are Middle Eastern politics so simple and/or corrupt? Probably because they generally revolve around money, as it is the main resource religious factions can stockpile and employ (besides weapons, perhaps) to keep themselves ensconced in power. I mean, I think we could have skipped the whole double-invasion and wars for two years if we had put a high enough price on Al-Qaidians in the first place. Reportedly, we paid $10 million for Zubaydah and $25 million for Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; would a cool $50 million be enough for Osama himself? As Sec. Clinton said, if I may paraphrase, its not like the Pak government doesn't know where he's holed up.

But my first observation answers that question. Pakistan will never give Osama up exactly BECAUSE he's the main one we want. That's EXACTLY the reason the Pak army is entirely focused on co-opting U.S. manpower and money to aid them in their fight against the Taliban, BUT NOT THE ONES WE WANT - not the Quetta Shura and not bin Laden. As long as those sly Pakis can keep us on the hook, we'll basically fund their war, keep the Indians off their invasion-deserving asses (Mumbai, anyone?) and give them enough extra to ensure an escape plan for all of the ISI, not to mention Zardari and his cronies, once he gets ousted somehow.

I've got to say, if I were Obama and wanting to send a message with my troop decision, I'd be floating proposals to CUT troop levels and turn the whole affair into a CT mission. After all, Michael Cohen correctly notes that we're employing entire armies to go after a group that's supposedly hovering around 200 CORE MEMBERS. I mean, any realistic cost/benefit analysis alone would recommend a decrease, rather than increase in troops, especially in view of the need for smart, young idealists to help redirect and restart the domestic economy.

Obama's Af-Pak Gambit (Updated)

The Grey Lady reports that Obama has whittled his way down to three options for Af-Pak, all involving significant troop escalations (20,000 or more):

The options include Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s request for roughly another 40,000 troops; a middle scenario sending about 30,000 more troops; and a lower alternative involving 20,000 to 25,000 reinforcements, according to the officials, who insisted on anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. Officials hope to present the options to Mr. Obama this week before he leaves on a trip to Asia.

Gates is rumored to be backing the middle option, but right now the differences are negligible enough for overall analysis, I think. My analysis, in short, is that the president, in deciding on essentially a counterinsurgency strategy, has made a very bold play for the hearts and minds of far-away populaces - a gambit that could cost him and the country much more than alternative courses of action and one that ultimately seems likely to continue to fail.

Basically, my read on the news is that President Obama has chosen to indicate to the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan that the United States is full-on committing to the conflict at least through his first term. I mean, Michael Cohen is dead right when he says that deployment, wait-and-see time, and assessment and review of this strategy will certainly take us up to 2012.

President Obama, in selecting a strategy such as those outlined above, is making a move that will define his presidency. He is finally and indisputably making Afghanistan his war, both in the minds of Americans and in those of Afghans and Pakistanis. This political message shouldn't be underestimated; ask any Af-Pak "expert" worth his salt (especially the counterinsurgency fans like Gen. McChrystal) and he'll tell you the population is the "center of gravity" in the whole conflict. But the problem is, I don't think counterinsurgency, especially if it involves, as it apparently does, ceding the countryside to the bandits and circling wagons around "the 10 major population centers" truly has a chance of changing anything in Afghanistan.

Here's the theory behind Obama's decision: IF we convince the people of Afghanistan that we're there for the long haul AND we can secure them in their homes AND we can convince them that the rebels (Taliban, al-Qaida - who are we even fighting for sure?) are getting beaten or seriously weakened AND we can make their government more accountable and effective, reversing a tradition of societal corruption AND we can train their army and corrupt police forces to protect themselves AND we can switch them over from growing poppy to crop X (as yet undetermined), THEN the people will jump on the U.S. bandwagon, the terrorists will wither and die from lack of money/new recruits/intimidation capability and our troops should be home in about 3-5 years, safe in the knowledge that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for terrorism, or at least it wasn't when we left.

Now, if the number of ANDs in that sentence didn't clue you in to how tenuous and absurd I think COIN is in Afghanistan, perhaps there's the simple fact that WE'VE BEEN DOING IT FOR 8 YEARS. How has it worked out thus far? Come to think of it, how is Obama's ostensible plan truly any different from those that came before, except with EVEN MORE TROOPS?

How does allowing the rebels to roam free outside 10 major population centers A) protect rural populaces, with whom rebels most frequently interact or B) give us offensive advantage to show the population that we're winning, a vital part of COIN?
How does it truly damage al-Qaida, whose strategic bases and top commanders are generally agreed to be in Pakistan and in the Eastern/Southern borderlands? How does it ensure that poppy yields fall and the rebels continue to have their primary income source eaten away?

Clearly, there are going to be some tough questions to answer if this strategy is chosen, as appears likely. Perhaps the full plan, including details, will change the story and prove my COIN paranoia premature; if not, Obama has brought resolve to Afghanistan, but not innovation or adaptation - necessary, but not sufficient.

Update: Perhaps my vexation was for naught - NYT has revised its story on the president's options slightly, clarifying that while Gates, Mullen and Sec. Clinton have generally supported a moderate-to-large troop increase, Obama remains unsatisfied with the answers he's getting, and has included a mystery fourth option in the discussion to which no troop number will be given. To me, it seems probable that the VP's CT-focused plan is getting a second chance.

Left v. Right

(h/t David McCandless)

McChrystal's Mistakes Serving as First Steps for Obama?

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has made a couple of major faux pas in his management of Afghanistan - we may very well owe him a debt of gratitude for both of them. Since his promotion in June to supreme commanding general in Afghanistan, I would contend that he has done more than anyone to turn the situation around..and all accidentally.

First, his second troop request (let's stop calling it a recommendation; he's asking the president, not telling him) was the catalyst for the still ongoing(?), super-thorough Afghanistan strategy review, from which at least an initial, very sensible point of clarity has been gleaned: The people we're fighting with - the Karzai tribe a.k.a. "Afghan National Government" - generally don't care that much about the people we're fighting for - the Afghan people, a.k.a. the "center of gravity in Afghanistan", as well as indirectly and preemptively for ourselves.

The conceptual breakthrough of linking our military strategy with the, let's say, suitability of the host-nation government we're literally fighting to empower should not be underestimated. It clearly stumped the Bush administration, and despite endlessly repeated complaints and red flags from our commanders in the field, not to mention civilians, about their experiences with ANG officials, it's taken until now to sink in. Obviously, this analytical first step doesn't address our ultimate objective of a terrorist safe-haven-less Af-Pak, but it's a first step nonetheless, and progress.

Nor should serious thinkers miss the significance of Gen. McChrystal's most recent slip-up, in which he off-handedly referred to a red-teamed CIA analysis on Afghanistan entitled "Chaosistan." The document apparently characterizes the country as the name would imply: a vast, semi-governed area in which a multitude of major and minor factions vie for power or seek to achieve myriad objectives, which, incidentally, doesn't present favorable conditions for the establishment of an honest, effective national government.

Whether McChrystal mentioned "Chaosistan" as a viable, valuable piece of analysis or an example of a clearly off-the-wall, silly idea is the most crucial question. Why? Because Afghanistan is Chaosistan! Okay, let me scale that back: Chaosistan, the concept, offers some great insights into our troubles in Afghanistan that go beyond cookie-cutter COIN doctrine. I mean, sure, COIN tells you your host government needs to be sufficiently honest and effective, but it doesn't exactly tell you what to do if it's just not and really unlikely to be in the future.

"Chaosistan" lets U.S. strategy move past the delusion of a viable host-nation partner, at least in the short term, and compels us to deal with Afghanistan as it truly is - something like a huge American Wild West, where tribes and gangs run the local scenes and the rule of law of the national government is only enforced sporadically, and usually only during the daytime.

You control only what territory you patrol in Chaosistan, and that control is constantly open to challenge by a rival's posse and their Russian-made automatic six-shooters. Obviously, the metaphor has its limits, especially since gradual colonization and subjugation of Native American tribes were the "solutions" to taming the Wild West at home, but like the linkage between military and political plans, this represents, I think, major conceptual progress.

I believe Gen. McChrystal's re-request and his "Chaosistan" slip have been and could continue to be critical, if incidental, factors in driving U.S. policy and planning toward greater effectiveness and clarity in Afghanistan. But will they be those starting points, or will they end up forgotten waypoints in the bloody epic that is the war in Afghanistan?

P.S. Even the part of the Newsweek article about the McChrystal staffer giving out the wrong link smacks of suspiciously genius ineptitude. What a cunning way to throw off the press, if you assume McChrystal already knew he'd messed up. This guy's serendipitous incompetence even runs down to his staff!

Bye, Bye Cheap Gas (Updated)

The BBC reports that the UK Economic Research Council (it's actually the UK Energy Research Centre) has released a meta-analysis report indicating that peak oil is likely before 2030 and governments should be more concerned and attentive to that likelihood.

Update: CJR thoughtfully questions the media's capability to thoroughly and responsibly cover energy anf environmental issues.

Summer in October

Maybe it's due to the oddly temperate weather that seems to be persisting around the District, but I've been generally optimistic lately. Things somehow seem a little bit brighter than a few months ago, in many respects...

Item 1: So the P5+1 (5 permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany) have managed to get Iran to the table to discuss, well, things. The problem is that the wrong Iranian is seated there. Instead of talking to the calm, pragmatic Mir Hussein Moussavi, we are stuck trying to deal with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an infuriating bombast who just stole a "democratic" election.

I'm going to go with Ray Takeyh on this one and suggest that the Obama administration really explores just how committed Ahmadinejad is to these talks by pressing him on human rights, support for terrorist groups, et cetera. Perhaps such discussions could even reinject some momentum into Iran's domestic opposition (as would removing the MEK/PMOI from the U.S. and EU terror lists). BTW, check out Takeyh's House Armed Services Committee testimony from 2006 - pretty incisive, especially considering the date.

Item 2: Found a couple of great journalistic outlets: ProPublica and the Columbia Journalism Review. You'll notice them and a few other new sites on the good old blog roll.

Item 3: Well, Gen. McChrystal decided that he didn't ask for quite enough troops the first time around, and apparently he needs 40,000 more with as few questions asked and as little consideration given as possible, thank you very much. Thus, Obama finds himself rethinking his newly proclaimed Af-Pak strategy almost as soon as it hit the presses.

I'll say right off that I'm gratified to hear that Barry is taking his time with this one and ostensibly thinking things through. No doubt, he's got quite an eclectic collection of plans and advice swirling around him in the White House these days.

Sometimes, you just need someone to bring things into perspective for you, from a strategic perspective. That someone, for me today, was Marc Lynch. He raises some VERY SALIENT and I would say crucial questions regarding the direction and objectives of our adventure in the Wild Wild West of the Middle East, such as: Why isn't "muddling through" an option? Why will Afghanistan's government be able to support and resource an effective COIN strategy? What about Pakistan?

These kinds of questions don't get raised that often on the myopic TV shouting matches between representatives of the "go all in" contingent and the "get the hell out" crowd, and I'm heartened to know that at least the guy in charge realizes that his options extend beyond those two.

Hump Day Roundup

Mid-week, mid-year - what's up?

Item 1: Our friendly neighbors to the south continue to relax drug policies, which is at least movement in the right direction. It's unfortunate that Mexico continues to ignore the relatively easy, painless way out of its drug problems - legalization and regulation. Argentina, long a particularly cosmopolitan nation, shows more promise, establishing a clear, common-sense drug policy that also aims to limit potential social harms.

Item 2: It may be too early to call for a tactical retreat while Pakistan gets its house in order, but I'm certainly not the only one getting more and more anxious over the growing absurdity of our aspirations for Afghanistan, which, as Michael Cohen continues to consistently point out, seem increasingly ill-conceived.

Item 3: Health care. Perhaps you've heard all the screaming and shouting? Yes, America is debating itself again, and you can therefore bet it needs someone to clean up some faulty discourse. T.R. Reid is today's myth-busting superstar for an excellent article setting the record straight on health care in the rest of the industrialized world.

My Security for Your Security - The U.S. and Iran (Updated)

In the realm of American foreign policy these days, besides the ongoing wars in the Middle East, probably the most important and urgent issue is that of Iranian nuclear aspirations. Not only is Israel understandably freaking out and threatening to strike pre-emptively, but if the Iranians are in fact pursuing weaponization, rather than simply the peaceful ends they claim they're after, they represent a serious threat to global security and stability. Moreover, as a widely recognized state-sponsor of terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the thought of that regime attaining nuclear-weapon technology becomes seriously unsettling.

So how can we, the "Great Satan," stop Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons technology? Well, I would argue that there is one thing that Iran has been obsessed with since its revolution and conversion to virulent anti-Americanism - security. The Iranian regime has long been paranoid about our stated foreign policy goal of regime change, and with good reason, considering our actions in neighboring Iran and Afghanistan, as well as our past history. In fact, I would submit that this was both the original impetus and continues to be the driving motivation for their seeming obsession with gaining nuclear power; they believe it will give them some final, indisputable measure of security from American interference or aggression.

So what's the solution here? Harsher sanctions, more efforts to isolate the regime and the people, and the not-so-subtle threat of military action whenever we decide they've crossed the line? I think not. In fact, those types of actions, which can all be considered mainstays of American foreign policy regarding Iran, would only seem, to me, to heighten their paranoia and further distance the people and government from the international community.

Rather, the goal should be to assuage the regime's fears and try to draw it into the international community, where norms and standards of behavior can be more effectively applied and enforced. The initial draw to pull Iran back from the brink of weaponization, I think, should be an iron-clad U.S. security guarantee so that the regime could rest easier regarding what they see as our penchant for regime change.

That's right, it's a basic security-for-security trade. We give you the security guarantee that your government wants so much (evidence for this ascribed desire here and here and well, in lots of places) and you, in turn, stop threatening to destabilize your region and become a pseudo-terrorist state with nuclear weapons. I mean, Secretary of State Clinton has already set this deal up with her arguments that nuclear capability will not provide Iran the security it seeks; she obviously recognizes what the regime wants.

And to those who claim this is a sellout of Iranian hopes for democracy or something to that effect, I would claim A, potential nuclear terrorism trumps sociopolitical developmental goals for Iran and B, democratic values and ideals are much more likely to flourish in an Iran that is drawn into the international community and finds reconciliation (and, dare I say, economic ties?) with Western powers rather than in an Iran that is isolated and paranoid about U.S.-backed uprisings. It's high time American foreign policy took a long-term perspective and focused on achievable goals like security and nonproliferation rather than worldwide democratization.

Moreover, ultimately, Iran NEEDS this acceptance into the international community. As Roger Cohen aptly describes, their society and their economy demand greater contact with the outside world. Iran is no Afghanistan - no vast country sparsely populated with largely uneducated tribesmen. Its populace has the sophistication and education necessary to drive its economy into the top tier, if only the proper political and social environment could be created. Even without American security guarantees the simple economic situation of the country puts a lot of pressure on the clearly incompetent and inept administration of Ahmadinejad, as well as his overlord, the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

This brings me to another reason why this is a good plan to deal with Iran: the country has changed and the time is ripe. By increasing the friendship factor and offering security guarantees, Obama would continue fanning the flames of pro-Western (or at least anti-corrupt, anti-Ahmadinejad) masses, who clearly desire competent governance, adding more pressure to the regime to open some good-faith negotiations, at the very least. As one Iranian cleric has said already, "If we can't make nice with an American president named Obama who is sending us Nowruz greetings and preaching 'mutual respect and mutual interest' then the problem lies in Tehran, not in Washington.

Finally, I'd like to note that this security guarantee offer is not a novel concept that I just invented. Many, many observers, including the Russian government, have called for exactly the same measures. And tellingly, former SecState Condi Rice had to explicitly negate the option when the Bush admin. was still running the show; if she wouldn't go through with it, you know it's probably a good idea.

For all of these reasons, it's time to shift American foreign policy from it's unrealistic, impractical foundations, at least regarding Iran, and use smart power to ease tensions and further nonproliferation. Security guarantees likely provide the path to do this, whereas further sanctions and military threats against an inherently anti-American regime will bear little fruit. Ultimately, such a strategy is likely to secure immediate U.S. interests, such as Iranian stoppage of nuclear programs, while also providing long-term conditions for social and political liberalization in Iran. Use your head on this one, Obama, and you've got a chance to make history...

Update: Today's headlines support this strategy even more. By offering potential security concessions to a legitimate government, the Obama administration can put even greater pressure on the side of the reformers/challengers in this Iranian political schism, great alienating the supreme leader and his ilk. Go for it, Barry and Hil!

Bru-yes

Last week, I eagerly joined the throngs of young, rabid Americans thirsty for Sacha Baron Cohen's latest cinematic offering: "Bruno." Cohen's tale of a flaming Austrian fashion show host scheming and scrabbling for fame in America toppled Ice Age to rake in around $30 million in its first weekend, and should do well in fiscal terms.

Cinematically, though, "Bruno" was somewhat of a bitter pill to swallow, falling somewhere along the continuum between shock comedy and gay porn. The gags on the unsuspecting victims, Cohen's trademark at this point, are generally hilarious and well-executed to the point of arousing suspicion (sexually harassing a redneck hunting guide in the middle of the night without prior approval? Unlikely, even for Cohen). And the overall significance of the movie, in which Bruno's schemes to get Ameri-famous hilariously fail, is actually somewhat deep. BTW, For a mind-bending over-analysis of both the thought that went into the movie and the reactions to the gags from the victims, see Lee Siegel on the Daily Beast.

The real obstacle, which has already been noted widely, to this film's success is its unapologetic lewdness. I mean, they came very close to rating this movie NC-17 here in the States and in Britain, they're releasing an edited version for those viewers under 18 (although it supposedly is only about two minutes shorter, overall). Why? Because male genitalia is not just humorously referenced or slyly implied in this movie; it is shoved in your face singing and dancing and swinging around. If you're not comfortable with some serious making out of men, you might want to think twice about this one, as, reportedly, many fans did on opening night for the same reason. Overall, I'd say Bruno was certainly worth the money and the hype, but this is definitely one that they'll be IDing for in a theater near you.

Cannabis in the Capital? (Updated)

Looks like America's capital may finally get around to allowing medical marijuana, thanks to the likely repeal of the odious Barr Amendment from D.C.'s appropriations bill. As a District resident, I heartily applaud the potential repeal and urge the city commissioners, as well as Congress broadly, to consider implementing a dispensary program similar to those established in California. Furthermore, a broad decriminalization wouldn't hurt either.

Until this benign drug is removed from the black market and brought into the open market, all of those that it affects will remain trapped between criminal actors and entities on the one hand and the unyielding United States government on the other. That is no place for users and supporters of a such a harmless plant. (h/t to MPP's blogger, Ben Morris).

Update: Don't miss this fascinating interview/liveblog with Ryan Grim the author of "This is Your Country On Drugs" on FDL. Looks like a great read!